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I. BACKGROUND
Immigration law is overseen by Congress, deriving its authority directly
from the Constitution itself.1 The Supreme Court of the United States has
constantly reiterated that “[o]ver no conceivable subject . . . is the legislative
power of Congress more complete.”2 This power is best exemplified
through the plenary power doctrine, under which Congress effectively limits
judicial scrutiny over immigration laws.3 Scholars and courts alike have
come to understand the concept of “plenary” as a power that is accorded

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2012)
(“This authority rests, in part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to ‘establish [a]
uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and its inherent power as sovereign to
control and conduct relations with foreign nations.” (quoting Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982))).
2. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP.
CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909)) [hereinafter Legomsky, Immigration Law]. But see Lupe S. Salinas, Deportations, Removals and the
1996 Immigration Acts: A Modern Look at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 245, 262 (2004)
(“The United States Constitution does not actually give Congress plenary power over immigration; it
instead gives the Congress the power to establish a ‘uniform Rule of Naturalization.’”).
3. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J.
458, 458 (2009) (introducing the plenary power doctrine and related issues).
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“unusually great deference, at or approaching non-reviewability.”4
Consequently, since its inception in the late nineteenth century,5 the plenary
power doctrine “has effectively insulated federal immigration statutes from
constitutional review.”6
Congress’s power to regulate immigration is codified in the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).7 Among the subjects codified within
the INA are “several classes of deportable noncitizens, including those
convicted of aggravated felonies, crimes of moral turpitude, controlled
substance violations, and crimes of violence.”8 Ordinarily, when a
noncitizen has been convicted of a crime outlined by the INA, he or she will
be deemed removable.9 Following this determination, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)10 will initiate removal proceedings11 by serving
the noncitizen with a “notice to appear,” outlining the reasons for removal,
4. Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review,
78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1616 (2000) [hereinafter Legomsky, Fear and Loathing].
5. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606–07 (1889) (“The power of the
government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its judgment, the public interests
require such exclusion, has been asserted in repeated instances, and never denied by the executive or
legislative departments.”).
6. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing, supra note 4, at 1615.
7. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–537 (2012)); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1637 (2010) (“[T]he Immigration and Nationality Act governs the
admission of noncitizens to the United States, their expulsion from the United States, and a host of
miscellaneous decisions.”) [hereinafter Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication].
8. Ashwin Gokhale, Note, Finality of Conviction, the Right to Appeal, and Deportation Under
Montenegro v. Ashcroft: The Case of the Dog That Did Not Bark, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 241, 244 (2005) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2000)).
9. See Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 7, at 1642.
10. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States Government underwent a
complete reorganization, which involved changing the way immigration services were divided and
handled. See generally Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Post-9/11 Policies Dramatically Alter the U.S.
Immigration Landscape, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/post-911-policies-dramatically-alter-us-immigration-landscape
[https://perma.cc/L2GXJPKH] (summarizing the changes). For instance, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
the immigration branch that handled all immigration services, ceased to exist and was replaced by the
new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which split the responsibilities of the naturalization
services and immigration enforcement between the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) and United States Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), respectively. 6 U.S.C. § 291
(2012); see also Chishti & Bergeron, supra (explaining the new immigration and screening policies).
11. “Removal proceedings are the forum for determining whether noncitizens should be
removed from the United States, either upon seeking admission (formerly called exclusion hearings)
or after admission (formerly called deportation [proceedings]).” Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, supra note 7, at 1641.
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so as to place the noncitizen under formal notice.12 An immigration judge
will then conduct an evidentiary hearing,13 which will be subject to appellate
review by the Board of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.).14 The filing of the
appeal automatically stays execution of the immigration judge’s decision.15
In some instances, however, an immigration judge’s decision may be subject
to judicial review in federal court.16 In interpreting an immigration statute,
federal courts will generally accord deference to the B.I.A.’s interpretation,
so long as it is a reasonable construction of the statute.17
II. THE PRE-IIRIRA DEFINITION OF A “CONVICTION”
A. Judicially-Constructed Definition of a “Conviction”
Before the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),18 finality of a conviction for immigration
purposes was continually redefined by case law, ultimately resulting in
divergent results for noncitizens dependent on their location.19 The finality
12. Immigration and Nationality Act § 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012).
13. Id.
14. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1).
15. Id. § 1003.1(b)(3).
16. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas
Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 461 (2006) (“Although general provisions for judicial review did not
appear in federal immigration statutes until 1961, federal courts nonetheless had long assumed
jurisdiction in immigration cases because of the simple fact that physical restraint was inherently
involved in the removal of an unwilling noncitizen.” (footnotes omitted)). But see Legomsky,
Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 7, at 1643–44 (“The three main classes of cases for which
judicial review is barred are expedited removal orders, most discretionary determinations, and most
cases in which the noncitizens are removable on crime-related grounds.” (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)).
17. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (announcing
the principle that courts will not replace their own reading of a statute for an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute, unless that interpretation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute” (footnote omitted)); see also The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 513 (1989) (“Leading cases support the view
that great deference must be given to the decisions of an administrative agency applying a statute to
the facts and that such decisions can be reversed only if without rational basis . . . .” (quoting Pittston
Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), aff’d sub nom. Northeast Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977))).
18. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (codified as amended at Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(48(A),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012)) (codifying the definition of a “conviction” for immigration purposes).
19. See Gokhale, supra note 8, at 245 (“Before passage of IIRIRA, the definition of what
constituted a ‘conviction’ for immigration purposes was an ever-evolving judicial construct.” (citing In
re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 548–49 (B.I.A. 1988))).
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rule was first formulated by the Supreme Court in Pino v. Landon.20 In
establishing a finality rule, the Court reversed the judgment of the First
Circuit in Pino v. Nicholls.21 In Nicholls, the First Circuit considered whether
a noncitizen could be deported, even though his sentence was revoked after
termination of probation and his case was placed “on file instead of finally
disposing of it by dismissing it.”22 The court held that an alien who had
been found guilty, sentenced, and placed on probation following suspension
of his sentence had been “convicted” of a crime involving moral turpitude
because “[p]lacing the case on file was not the equivalent to a revocation.”23
Subsequently, in 1957, the B.I.A. refrained from making any decisions
based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pino as to what constituted
“finality” of a conviction.24 The Board did find, however, that an
imposition of punishment or fine after a finding of guilt was a “conviction”
under the Act,25 as opposed to a deferred adjudication as exemplified in
Nicholls.26 In its discussion, the Board outlined four separate situations
considered convictions under New York law: (1) “[t]he court imposes a
punishment of fine or imprisonment”;27 (2) “[t]he court imposes
punishment of fine or imprisonment, but suspends payment of fine or the
service of the imprisonment”;28 (3) the court does not order any
punishment and stays the imposition of sentence;29 and (4) “[t]he court
postpones for a long period further consideration of the case.”30 In its
analysis, the Board found with certainty only that: a category (1) situation was

20. Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901, 901 (1955) (per curiam) (“On the record here we are unable
to say that the conviction has attained such finality as to support an order of deportation within the
contemplation of . . . the Immigration and Nationality Act.”).
21. Pino v. Nicholls, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954), rev’d sub nom. Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901
(1955).
22. Id. at 242.
23. Id. at 244–45.
24. See In re O-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 539, 544 (B.I.A. 1957) (acknowledging the “short and summary”
nature of the Court’s order, the Board stated that it did not presume to know what factors influenced
the Court’s decision).
25. See id. at 542 (“A person so found guilty and sentenced would normally be considered as
having been convicted for all purposes.”).
26. See generally Nicholls, 215 F.2d at 237.
27. In re O-, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 540.
28. Id. at 541 (“The court has the power to place the defendant on probation, it may or may not
be a discretionary one. This is a suspension of the execution of sentence.” (emphasis added)).
29. Id. at 542 (“The court has the power to place the defendant on probation, it may or may not
be a discretionary one. This is the imposition of the sentence.” (emphasis added)).
30. Id. (“The case is still pending actually or theoretically for the imposition of sentence . . . .”).
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a conviction for immigration purposes,31 and a situation in category
(4) “does not achieve the finality necessary to support an order of
deportation under” INA section 241(a)(4).32 Although the Board, applying
New York law, also concluded that situations in categories (2) and (3)—
those with an element of deferred adjudication—could be characterized as
convictions for immigration purposes, it acknowledged that they could not
be “considered convictions for all purposes” as with category (1).33 In
effect, the Board distinguished the current situation from that in Pino, all
while declining to “draw conclusions” from its “short and summary”
decision.34
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Pino, most circuit courts
that addressed whether a “conviction” was sufficiently final for immigration
purposes held that “finality” required a sentence and the exhaustion of a
direct appeal as of right.35 The B.I.A., in In re Ozkok,36 in an attempt to
alleviate the “anomalous and unfair results” caused by “the many variations
in state procedure[s]” in determining who was considered “convicted” for

31. Id. (“Clearly, a conviction described in category (1) must serve as a conviction for the
purpose of section 241(a)(4).”).
32. Id. at 543 (emphasis added) (“[W]e believe it implied that an order in category (4) does not
achieve the finality necessary to support an order of deportation under this section.”).
33. Id. at 542–43 (“The sentence in neither category (2) nor (3) is considered a ‘final’ conviction
and neither sentence is a conviction for all purposes although both are convictions for some
purposes.”). The Board evidently wrestled with the idea that categories two and three, situations in
which imposition of a sentence is deferred, could reach as far as to define immigration law, and the
consequences that follow such a label. Id. (refusing to classify them as convictions for “all purposes”).
It nonetheless reasoned that the two categories represented “convictions” based on New York law at
the time, highlighting the conflicting applications of the law depending on the jurisdiction of the
conviction. Id. (“If, then, we are to give any effect to the express language of the law and legislative
intent behind it . . . we must find that in New York convictions in categories (2) and (3) satisfy the
requirements of section 241(a)(4) of the [A]ct . . . .” (emphasis added)).
34. Id. at 544.
35. See Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding a conviction is
final for immigration purposes when a court has convicted the noncitizen and that noncitizen has
exhausted all direct appeals, despite thereafter seeking discretionary review from the State’s highest
court); Hernandez-Almanza v. INS, 547 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1976) (establishing finality of a
conviction for immigration purposes when the petitioner failed to pursue a direct appeal, even if a
collateral attack on the conviction is brought thereafter); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 570
(6th Cir. 1975) (noting no disruption of finality of a conviction for immigration purposes from a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea once sentencing is imposed because the plea itself waived all direct
appeals to which the noncitizen was entitled (citing Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955))); Will v. INS,
447 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 1971) (acknowledging the pendency of a direct appeal as sufficient to nullify
the finality of a conviction for immigration purposes (citing Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955))).
36. In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (B.I.A. 1988).
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immigration purposes, decided to outline what constituted a “conviction”
under immigration law.37 The Board indicated that a “conviction” for
immigration purposes would exist when all of the following elements were
present:
(1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he has entered a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding
of guilty;
(2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on
the person’s liberty to be imposed (including but not limited to
incarceration, probation, a fine or restitution, or community-based
sanctions such as a rehabilitation program, a work-release or study-release
program, revocation or suspension of a driver’s license, deprivation of
nonessential activities or privileges, or community service); and
(3) a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person violates
the terms of his probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the
court’s order, without availability of further proceedings regarding the person’s guilt
or innocence of the original charge.38

In formulating this framework, the Board created a two-part test for
purposes of finding a “conviction” in the immigration context.39 The first
part of the test applied to formal judgments of guilt. Under this prong, a
person is found to be “convicted” for immigration purposes when “the
court has adjudicated [the person] guilty or has entered a formal judgment
of guilt”; no further inquiry was necessary.40 The second part of the test
applied to deferred adjudications—a type of probation which gives a
criminal defendant an opportunity to avoid being given a formal judgment
of guilt, so long as they comply with conditions imposed during the duration
of the probationary period.41 Under this second prong, “where an
adjudication of guilt has been withheld,” a conviction for immigration

37. Id. at 550. The concern was that noncitizens would be treated differently depending on the
state’s remedial measures for conviction purposes. Id. at 551.
38. Id. at 551–52 (emphasis added).
39. See Gokhale, supra note 8, at 248 (interpreting the Board’s definition as a “two-part test”).
40. In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 551.
41. See Jason A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 358–59 (2012) (“Under
current rules, a noncitizen may be deported on the basis of a conviction pending on direct appeal,
judicially expunged, or treated as a deferred adjudication or suspended sentence under state law.”).
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purposes would only lie when all three elements, as outlined above, were
met; further inquiry was necessary.42
Furthermore, the most notable aspect of the second prong and its three
elements was the footnote added at the end of the third element, which
incorporated the finality requirement.43 Under Ozkok, “finality” of a
conviction required the courts to allow a criminal defendant to exhaust or
waive all of their appeals before becoming sufficiently final to support the
imposition of a “conviction” and the consequences that followed.44
Ozkok’s definition of a “conviction” for immigration purposes stood
unquestioned until 1996 with the enactment of IIRIRA.45
III. THE ENACTMENT OF IIRIRA
A. Purpose
In 1996, Congress passed IIRIRA46 in conjunction with the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),47 both of which
amended the INA. Together, IIRIRA and AEDPA made significant
changes to deportation and removal procedures already in place.48

42. In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 551–52 (“[F]urther examination of the specific procedure
used and the state authority under which the court acted will be necessary.”).
43. See id. at 552 n.7 (“It is well established that a conviction does not attain a sufficient degree
of finality for immigration purposes until [a] direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted
or waived.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
44. Id.
45. In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 225 (B.I.A. 1998) (deeming a noncitizen deportable and
defining deferred adjudication as a “conviction” for immigration purposes pursuant to “the new
definition of the term ‘conviction[]’ . . . enacted by section 322 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996” (citing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 322, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–628)).
46. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
208, 110 Stat. 3009–546.
47. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat.
1214.
48. See Dawn Marie Johnson, Comment, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors as
Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477, 481 (2001) (“Both § 440(e) of the AEDPA and § 321
of the Immigration Reform Act of 1996 . . . expanded the definition of ‘aggravated felony.’”). This is
important because noncitizens classified as “aggravated felons” are barred from seeking most types of
relief from removal. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 712 (8th ed. 2016) (“[A]n aggravated felony conviction renders a noncitizen
deportable, and also ineligible for asylum, cancellation of removal, and voluntary departure.
Noncitizens . . . are also barred for life from re-entering the United States, unless they obtain consent
to apply for readmission.”).
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IIRIRA’s main goal was to reduce illegal immigration and, in an attempt to
accomplish that goal, it managed to:
(1) merge[] the former exclusion and deportation proceedings into a single
form of “removal” proceedings; (2) expand[] the authority to remove criminal
aliens without hearings before immigration judges; (3) curtail[] eligibility for
waivers and certain forms of discretionary relief from removal; and
(4) curtail[] the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review decisions made
on discretionary waivers and relief.49

In imposing such strong measures, IIRIRA essentially mandated detention
during removal proceedings even if the noncitizen was not a danger to the
community or a flight risk, limited judicial discretion, and expanded the list
of crimes that led to deportation.50 IIRIRA’s mandate resulted in the
deportation of more aliens due to criminal activities than in the years
preceding the enactment of the 1996 statute.51 Furthermore, consistent
with its overall purpose as outlined above, IIRIRA widened “the scope of
what is considered a ‘conviction’ for immigration purposes.”52
B. Definition of a “Conviction” Under IIRIRA
IIRIRA codified Ozkok’s definition of a conviction for immigration
purposes virtually verbatim:
The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of
guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been
withheld, where—
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a
finding of guilt, and

49. Edward R. Grant, Laws of Intended Consequences: IIRIRA and Other Unsung Contributors to the
Current State of Immigration Litigation, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 923, 927 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
50. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of
Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1937–38 (2000).
51. See Johnson, supra note 48, at 481–83 (explaining how the “expanded definition” of
aggravated felony for immigration purposes increased the number of aliens eligible for deportation).
52. Gokhale, supra note 8, at 249. In widening the definition of a conviction, IIRIRA exposed
noncitizens not only to the possibility of removal, but also made it more difficult, and in some situations
impossible, for the noncitizen to qualify not only for relief from removal but for readmission as well.
See Johnson, supra note 48, at 482–83 (discussing the consequences of aggravated felony convictions).
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(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on
the alien’s liberty to be imposed.53

In codifying the definition of a “conviction” for immigration purposes,
IIRIRA adopted the first element of Ozkok’s definition word-for-word.54
It omitted the parenthetical from the second element, and left out the third
element entirely, which allowed for a judgment of guilt if the noncitizen
violated the terms of his deferred adjudication “without availability of further
proceedings regarding the person’s guilt or innocence of the original charge.”55
Furthermore, and most notably, in omitting the third element completely,
IIRIRA’s definition of a conviction also left out footnote 7 which carried
the language of “finality.”56
C. Legislative History
Legislative history surrounding the enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A) of
the Act, indicates that Congress purposely intended to “broaden[] the scope
of the definition of ‘conviction’ beyond that adopted by the Board of
Immigration Appeals in Ozkok.”57 The House Conference Report
expressed that Congress’s main concern in enacting section 101(a)(48)(A) of
53. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
208, § 322, 110 Stat. 3009–628 (codified as amended at Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012)).
54. Compare In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 550 (B.I.A. 1988), with Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 110 Stat. 3009–628 (codified as amended at Immigration and
Nationality Act § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012)).
55. Compare In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 550 (emphasis added), with Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, 110 Stat. 3009–628.
56. Compare In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 552 n.7 (“It is well established that conviction does
not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review of the
conviction has been exhausted or waived.” (emphasis added)), with Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act, 110 Stat. 3009–628, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012) (codifying the
definition of the term “conviction” without any reference to “finality” language). This omission, and
the Congressional silence surrounding it, is the cause of the current circuit splits. Compare Planes v.
Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Accordingly, we conclude that the first definition of
‘conviction’ in § 1101(a)(48)(A) requires only that the trial court enter a formal judgment of guilt,
without any requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or waived.”), with Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of
U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We are therefore convinced that the principle announced and
held in Ozkok—that ‘a conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration
purposes until direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived’–– . . . ‘is alive
and well’ in this Circuit and is correctly applied to Orabi as this Circuit’s precedent.” (quoting In re
Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 552 n.7)).
57. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 223–24 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (citing In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec.
at 546).
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the Act concerned “aliens who have clearly been guilty of criminal behavior
and whom Congress intended to be considered ‘convicted’” yet “have
escaped the immigration consequences normally attendant upon a
conviction.”58 The Report explains that although Ozkok had made it more
difficult for those guilty of criminal behavior to escape consequences, it had
not gone “far enough to address situations where a judgment of guilt or
imposition of sentence is suspended, conditioned upon the alien’s future good
behavior.”59 The Report targets Ozkok’s third element specifically.60
Two purposes are outlined for the enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A) of
the Act in the Report. The first purpose, accomplished through the
elimination of the third prong of Ozkok, “clarifies Congressional intent that
even in cases where adjudication is ‘deferred,’ the original finding or
confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a ‘conviction’ for purposes of
the immigration laws.”61 The second purpose, achieved through the
addition of a definition, clarifies that “any court-ordered sentence is
considered to be ‘actually imposed,’ including where the court has
suspended the imposition of a sentence.”62 Thus, the Report’s focus lies in
convictions that involve deferred adjudication––situations in which a
sentence is postponed. It follows that the omission of the third prong of
Ozkok purports to be an intention on the part of Congress to clarify that
deferred adjudication should also be considered a conviction, consistent
with the overall purpose of IIRIRA.63 However, legislative history is silent
on Congress’s omission of footnote 7 regarding the language of finality.64
Congressional silence as to the existence of finality of a conviction for
immigration purposes has led to a split between the circuit courts.65
Although most circuits have not affirmatively denied or accepted the
58. Id. at 224.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. See id. (“For example, the third [element] of Ozkok requires that a judgment or adjudication
of guilt may be entered if the alien violates a term or condition of probation, without the need for any
further proceedings regarding guilt or innocence on the original charge.”).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Grant, supra note 49, at 926 (highlighting IIRIRA’s goal in reducing illegal immigration
to the United States).
64. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 104-828.
65. Compare United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 2004) (“To support
an order of deportation, a conviction must be final. Finality requires the defendant to have exhausted
or waived his rights to direct appeal.” (citations omitted)), with Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1009
(5th Cir. 1999) (“Congress has made the policy choice to eliminate the finality requirement, and we will
not second-guess such policy choices properly made by the legislative branch.” (citations omitted)).
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principle of finality, two circuit courts have made their stance clear. The
Ninth Circuit has concluded that the finality requirement, which was initially
outlined in Ozkok, has been eliminated completely through the enactment
of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act,66 while the Third Circuit has held that
finality of a conviction for immigration purposes is still required after the
enactment of 101(a)(48)(A), at least for those situations in which a “formal
judgment of guilt” is subject to a direct appeal.67
IV. DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NINTH AND THIRD CIRCUITS
A. The Ninth Circuit: No Finality Rule
Under Ninth Circuit law, a formal judgment of guilt constitutes a
“conviction” pursuant to section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, regardless of
whether “all direct appeals [have been] exhausted or waived.”68 In Planes v.
Holder,69 Michael Angelo Planes, a lawful permanent resident of the United
States, pled guilty and was convicted of possessing fifteen or more access
devices,70 classified as a crime of moral turpitude.71 He later “appealed the
sentence imposed for [his conviction], but did not appeal the conviction
itself.”72 The Ninth Circuit thereafter remanded the petitioner’s challenge

66. Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Accordingly, we conclude that the first
definition of ‘conviction’ in [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(a)(48)(A) requires only that the trial court enter a formal
judgment of guilt, without any requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or waived.”).
67. Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We do not agree that the
IIRIRA eliminated a direct appeal from the finality rule in its definition of conviction.”).
68. Planes, 652 F.3d at 996.
69. Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, 686 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.
2012).
70. “Access device” is defined as:
[A]ny card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile identification number,
personal identification number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument
identifier, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another
access device to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used
to initiate a transfer of funds.
18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1) (2012).
71. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (describing the effect of a crime of moral turpitude
conviction for immigration purposes). However, the INA does not provide a definition for “crimes
involving moral turpitude.” See Derrick Moore, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: Why the Void-ForVagueness Argument Is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813, 814 (2008) (“The phrase
‘crimes involving moral turpitude’ has been described as ‘vague,’ ‘nebulous,’ ‘most unfortunate,’ and
even ‘bewildering.’” (citations omitted)).
72. Planes, 652 F.3d at 993.
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to the district court; Planes, however, was later deemed removable pursuant
to his conviction and placed in removal proceedings, even though the
district court had not yet ruled on the issue regarding the sentence of his
conviction.73
Planes appealed to the B.I.A., arguing that his conviction was not
sufficiently final “because he had not yet been resentenced”74 by the district
court, thus he was not yet subject to removal. The Board disagreed; it held
that Planes was considered “convicted” under 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, even
though the district court was “entertaining arguments as to whether his
sentence could be modified.”75 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Board
and dismissed Planes’ petition for review.76 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
found that, despite the decisions cited by Planes,77 section 101(a)(48)(A) of
the Act made it clear that his conviction was final for immigration
purposes.78
Nonetheless, the dissent in the Planes denial of rehearing argued both that
the majority “overstepped its authority and decided the petition for review
on a ground not relied upon by the B.I.A.,”79 and, further, that it
disregarded Congress’s intent in holding that IIRIRA eliminated the finality
rule.80 The dissent also noted that Congress only eliminated the finality rule
with regard to deferred adjudications.81 A concurring judge disagreed,
73. Id. at 993–94.
74. Id. at 994.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 995 (“[A] ‘conviction’ for purposes of [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(a)(48)(A) exists once the
district court enters the judgment, notwithstanding the availability of an appeal as of right.” (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted)).
77. See Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901, 901 (1955) (indicating the need for “finality” before an
order of deportation may be upheld under the INA); Morales-Alvarado v. INS, 655 F.2d 172, 174–75
(9th Cir. 1981) (interpreting Pino to mean that a criminal conviction requires the exhaustion of all
appeals as a matter of right); Hernandez-Almanza v. INS, 547 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1976) (“The
finality of a conviction for purposes of deportation is determined by a federal standard—the exhaustion
or waiver of direct appeals.”).
78. Planes, 652 F.3d at 995 (dismissing the applicability of cases cited by Planes, “because they
were decided before the enactment of [section 101(a)(48)(A)] which supplants our prior
judicially-created standards”).
79. Planes v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 2012) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Nowhere,
not even in passing, is the finality rule ever mentioned by the agency. Nor was the issue briefed before
the B.I.A., or the panel, by either party.”).
80. Id. at 1039 (“[T]he rule had long been that a conviction is not final for immigration purposes
until the defendant has exhausted or waived his direct appeal as of right.”).
81. Id. at 1040 (“[C]onvictions as to which there is no entitlement to an immediate direct
appeal.”).
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relying on the plain language of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act and on
various other circuit courts82 for the determination that the finality
requirement had been eliminated.83
B. The Third Circuit: Finality Survives IIRIRA
Three years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Planes, the Third Circuit
held that the principle of finality established by Ozkok, “that ‘a conviction
does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until
direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived’–
– . . . ‘is alive and well.’”84 Omar Abd Gomaa Orabi, a lawful permanent
resident of the United States, was convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud
in connection with access devices, as well as other related offenses, and
sentenced to imprisonment of seventy months.85 In December 2011, Orabi
appealed both his sentence and conviction to the district court, which
remained pending during the instant case.86 Despite Orabi’s pending
appeal, he was found removable and placed in removal proceedings based
on his aggravated felony charge.87 Orabi appealed to the Board, arguing his
conviction lacked a sufficient degree of finality based on his pending district
court appeal; nonetheless, the Board, as in Planes, used what it believed was
a new definition of a conviction under 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act and
dismissed Orabi’s appeal, holding the “conviction remained final for
immigration purposes.”88

82. See Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1001–02 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding requirement of finality
had been eliminated by IIRIRA’s statutory language); Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration
Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting the elimination of the requirement that all direct
appeals be exhausted or waived before a conviction is considered final pursuant to the statute enacted
by IIRIRA); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037–38 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding the finality
requirement is eliminated based on the enactment of IIRIRA).
83. See Planes, 686 F.3d at 1040 (Ikuta, J., concurring) (“[T]he panel decided the issue before it
in a manner consistent with the plain language of the statute and with all other circuits that have ruled
on the issue.”).
84. Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 546, 552 n.7 (B.I.A. 1988)).
85. See id. at 537 (including offenses such as possession of counterfeit access devices, forged
checks, and aggravated identity theft).
86. See id. (noting Orabi’s seventy-month sentence remained in place despite the district court’s
amendment to its judgment and recalculation of his sentence in November 2011).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 538.
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In Orabi, the government extended three arguments in support of the
finality of Orabi’s conviction.89 The second argument paralleled the
argument the Ninth Circuit discussed in Planes, which focused on the issue
of appealing the sentence and not the conviction itself.90 The Third Circuit,
however, quickly dismissed this argument because the issue of whether
Orabi had appealed his sentence—or the conviction itself—had not been
determinative when the Board decided Orabi’s conviction was sufficiently
final to support a finding of guilt.91
In addressing the third argument, which focused on the finality
requirement, the Third Circuit referred to the legislative history surrounding
the enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, emphasizing that in
codifying the definition of a conviction, Congress’s intent focused on deferred
adjudications, not on formal judgments of guilt.92 The court further stressed
the absence of congressional intent to change the interpretation of a formal
judgment of guilt based on IIRIRA’s verbatim enactment of Ozkok’s first
prong,93 and held that “the finality requirement in immigration removal
cases remained undisturbed.”94 Consequently, Orabi’s pending appeal
precluded the finding of a “conviction” for immigration purposes and the
consequences following that determination.95

89. See id. at 539 (arguing (1) Orabi had withdrawn his appeal; (2) finality of a conviction for
immigration purposes existed because Orabi’s appeal was not a direct appeal as of right since it attacked
only “his sentence and not the finding of his guilt;” and (3) the court should look to other circuits and the
B.I.A., which supported the adoption of the position “that a conviction is final for immigration
purposes regardless of whether a direct appeal is pending.” (emphasis added)).
90. Compare Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Planes subsequently appealed
the sentence imposed for the § 1029(a)(3) offense, but did not appeal the conviction itself.” (emphasis
added)), with Orabi, 738 F.3d at 539 (“Orabi’s conviction was final regardless of whether his appeal was
withdrawn because his appeal only challenged his sentence and not the finding of his guilt . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
91. See Orabi, 738 F.3d at 539 (“Because the B.I.A. did not reach its decision based on this
ground, we may not affirm the judgment on this ground.” (citing Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947))).
92. See id. at 540 (“Understandably, Section 322 . . . addressed only adjudications that were
‘deferred’ . . . and instances in which the subject alien has violated a term or condition of probation.”
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 104–828, at 223–24 (1996) (Conf. Rep.))).
93. See id. at 540–41 (“The elimination of the finality provision for deferred adjudications, along
with the failure to make any change in the language regarding direct appeals as of right . . . demonstrates
Congress’ intent to retain the finality rule for the latter category of appeals.” (emphasis added) (quoting
Planes v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1033, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2012) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting))).
94. Id. at 540.
95. Id. 541–42 (“Given that Orabi’s appeal was one of right and that no deferred adjudication is at
issue here, we hold that the IIRIRA’s elimination of the finality requirement in the case of deferred
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V. FURTHER CIRCUIT SPLITS: DISCRETIONARY
AND COLLATERAL ATTACKS
A. The First Circuit: Deferred Adjudication
In Griffiths v. INS,96 the First Circuit agreed with the Board’s decision that
the noncitizen’s deferred adjudication constituted a conviction for
immigration purposes.97 Griffiths involved the conviction of a lawful
permanent resident for a firearms offense through a procedure known as
“guilty-filed”––an arrangement characterized as a deferred adjudication.98
In January of 1991, Alwyn Colin Griffiths was convicted and sentenced to
probation for one year with a six-month suspended imprisonment term.99
In April of 1993, the criminal court found him guilty and placed his charge
“on file,” but did not impose additional punishment.100 By this time,
Griffiths had completed his probation term and two years had passed since
his initial conviction.101 After an unsuccessful attempt to terminate his
deportation proceedings in 1993, Griffiths appealed his conviction to the
Board, arguing that “guilty-filed” could not support the imposition of a
conviction because it lacked finality, basing his determination on Ozkok’s
definition of a conviction “which governed at the time.”102 While Griffith’s
appeal to the B.I.A. was pending, Congress enacted IIRIRA in 1996, and in
May of 2000, the Board dismissed Griffiths’ appeal, relying both on the
newly enacted statutory definition of a “conviction” and on In re Punu103
which had been decided two years earlier.104
adjudications does not disturb the longstanding finality rule for direct appeals recognized in
Ozkok . . . .”).
96. Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001).
97. See id. at 54 (deferring to the B.I.A.’s reasonable interpretation of cases “wholly consistent
with the plain language” of the statute and “reflect[ing] a reasonable understanding of the purposes of
its enactment”).
98. See id. at 51 (discussing the guilty-filed procedure under Massachusetts law, which “suspends
the adjudicative process, including the defendant’s right to appeal, until such a time as the court
reactivates or makes some further disposition of the case” (quoting White v. INS, 17 F.3d 475, 479
(1st Cir. 1994))).
99. Id. at 48.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224 (B.I.A. 1998).
104. Id. Furthermore, “that the statutory definition of a ‘conviction’ broadened the scope of
‘conviction’ for immigration purposes to encompass some deferred adjudications, even where the right
to further appellate review of the issue of guilt or innocence on such deferred adjudications remained
available.” Griffiths, 243 F.3d at 49 (emphasis added); see also In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 227
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In Punu, Mark Gerald Punu, a lawful permanent resident, entered a plea
of nolo contendere in August of 1993 to an attempted murder charge––an
aggravated felony––and was placed on an eight-year probation period
scheduled to end in August of 2001.105 During Punu’s probation period,
Congress enacted IIRIRA, allowing INS to find him deportable pursuant to
the aggravated felony charge, thereby subjecting Punu to removal
proceedings.106 Punu urged several arguments for the proposition that his
deferred adjudication did not qualify as a “conviction” for immigration
purposes.107 The Board disagreed, most notably basing its decision on the
legislative history surrounding section 101(a)(48)(A) which focused on
Congressional intent to convict those “who have clearly been guilty of
criminal behavior and . . . have escaped the immigration consequences
normally attendant upon a conviction” due in large part to differing state
provisions enacted to mitigate “the effects of a conviction.”108
In Griffiths, the First Circuit deferred to the Board’s interpretation of
section 101(a)(48)(A) in Punu for the proposition that a deferred
adjudication no longer requires finality and is considered a “conviction” for
immigration purposes.109 However, in Griffiths, the First Circuit found the
record was inconclusive as to whether Griffiths had been properly convicted
under section 101(a)(48)(A), and thus remanded the case to the Board to
(highlighting the House Conference Reports with respect to section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, the court
found deliberate congressional intent to modify the definition of a conviction to include deferred
adjudications (first citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); and then citing H.R. REP.
NO. 104-879, at 295 (1996) (Conf. Rep.))).
105. See In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 224–25, 228.
106. See id. at 225 (“In finding the respondent deportable, the Immigration Judge held that his
deferred adjudication constituted a conviction for an aggravated felony under the new definition of the
term ‘conviction,’ which was enacted by section 322 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 . . . .” (citations omitted)).
107. See id. (“[A]ll direct appeals of his adjudication have not been exhausted; the statute does
not specifically reference deferred adjudications; the Texas deferred adjudication statute provides for
dismissal of charges upon completion of probation; and the new definition of conviction is
inapplicable, as his deferred adjudication was entered prior to its enactment.”).
108. See id. at 227 (“This new provision, by removing the third prong of Ozkok, clarifies
Congressional intent that even in cases where adjudication is ‘deferred,’ the original finding or
confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a ‘conviction’ for purposes of the immigration laws.” (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. Rep.))); see also Griffiths, 243 F.3d at 50 (“The BIA
attempted to create uniformity in the treatment of various state methods of disposing of criminal cases
by creating a controlling definition of ‘conviction’ for immigration purposes in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 564 (B.I.A. 1988) . . . .”).
109. See Griffiths, 243 F.3d at 53 (“Thus[,] under the B.I.A.’s construction of the statutory
definition, finality is no longer a requirement in cases where the adjudication of guilt has been
withheld.” (footnote omitted)).
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determine whether Griffiths’ completed probation was considered
punishment to fulfill the second prong of the statutory definition.110
The First Circuit’s holding in Griffiths is limited to deferred adjudications—
part of the second prong of section 101(a)(48)(A)—as is Punu’s holding.111
The court acknowledged that in deferring to the Board’s interpretation of
Punu it made no determinations regarding formal judgments of guilt,
codified in the first prong.112 The court also recognized the government’s
focus on the second prong of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act and its
reluctance to find a conviction when an appeal was pending under the first
prong of the statute.113 Thus, the Ninth, Third, and First Circuits are in
agreement with regard to the second prong of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the
Act and its consequences.114
B. The Second Circuit: Inconsistency Regarding Finality
The Second Circuit, in Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,115
focuses on Manuel Puello’s application for citizenship which was denied as
a result of an aggravated felony.116 Only in passing did the Second Circuit
110. See id. at 56 (“[W]e conclude that the Board did not properly determine that the petitioner
was convicted for immigration purposes under the statutory definition supplied by INA
§ 101(a)(48)(A).”).
111. See id. at 51 (“Implicit in [Punu’s] holding is a conclusion that the ‘finality’ requirement no
longer applied to deferred adjudications under the new definition, as the concurrence makes explicit.”
(citing In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 234 (Grant, J., concurring))).
112. See id. at 53 n.3 (“The Board did not address the meaning of the first prong of INA
§ 101(a)(48)(A), governing cases where there is a ‘formal judgment of guilt,’ in its decision construing
the statute[.]” (citing In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 234 n.1 (Grant, J., concurring))).
113. See id. at 54 (“The INS was careful at oral argument to say that it was not taking the position
it could deport someone adjudicated guilty while their appeal or appeal period was pending. Such
guilty adjudications would fall under the first prong.”). The court, here, is making an important
distinction. It makes no determinative findings as to the consequences of a pending appeal when there
has been a formal judgment of guilt—it does not decide whether an appeal warrants finality as
established by Ozkok—and further highlights the unwillingness of the government to maintain a
position as to that particular situation. It does, however, find that where an adjudication of guilt has
been withheld, there is no requirement of finality.
114. See Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[F]inality is not required under
the deferred-adjudication portion of § 1101(a)(48)(A).” (citing Griffiths, 243 F.3d at 50–51)); see also
Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 542–43 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Both the statutory language and the
legislative history reflect a determination that a distinct mode of treatment for deferred adjudications
is appropriate in this context.” (quoting Griffiths, 243 F.3d at 54)).
115. Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2007).
116. See id. at 326 (“Because Puello’s conviction was for an aggravated felony, as defined by
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), he was therefore ‘precluded from establishing good moral character since
his conviction occurred subsequent to November 29, 1990.’”).
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address the finality requirement.117 However, both the Ninth and the Third
Circuits have debated whether the discussion of the Second Circuit is
dicta.118 Subsequent to its decision in Puello, the Second Circuit issued an
unpublished decision alluding to the survival of the finality rule.119
In Abreu v. Holder,120 the Second Circuit examined the Board’s decision
in In re Cardenas Abreu.121 Both cases involved a lawful permanent resident
previously placed into removal proceedings based on an aggravated felony
conviction.122 Roberto Cardenas Abreu did not file an appeal within the
thirty-day period, and an order of removal was instituted by an immigration
judge in July of 2008.123 However, in October of 2008, Abreu filed a
motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the DHS, pursuant to a late
appeal granted by the state, arguing that his conviction lacked finality.124
The DHS denied the motion to reopen, and Abreu appealed to the Board
of Immigration Appeals.125
The Board conceded that the enactment of IIRIRA did nothing to disrupt
the finality rule.126 In fact, it further noted that “a forceful argument can
be made that Congress intended to preserve the long-standing requirement
of finality for direct appeals as of right in immigration law.”127 However,
117. See id. at 332 (“IIRIRA did, however, eliminate the requirement that all direct appeals be
exhausted or waived before a conviction is considered final under the statute.” (citations omitted)).
118. Compare Orabi, 738 F.3d at 542 (describing the discussion as dicta), and Planes v. Holder,
686 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2012) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (qualifying the language in Puello
regarding the finality rule as dicta, “as later recognized by the Second Circuit itself”), with id. at 1034 n.1
(Ikuta, J., concurring) (emphasizing the discussion in Puello which has been reiterated in two subsequent
unpublished opinions and with which “no Second Circuit opinion has disagreed”).
119. See Abreu v. Holder, 378 F. App’x 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Assuming arguendo that the
finality requirement remains in effect after the passage of the IIRIRA, an appeal reinstated pursuant to
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 460.30 is equivalent to any other direct appeal for the purposes of finality.”).
120. Abreu v. Holder, 378 F. App’x 59 (2d Cir. 2010).
121. In re Cardenas Abreu, 24 I. & N. Dec. 795 (B.I.A. 2009) (en banc).
122. See id. at 796 (“The respondent was placed in removal proceedings and was charged under
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006), as
an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.”).
123. Id.
124. See id. (“Over opposition from the State, the court granted the respondent’s motion on
September 26, 2008, reinstating the time for filing an appeal.”).
125. See id. (“The Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’) opposed the motion to reopen,
arguing that the respondent’s conviction remained final and valid for immigration purposes.”).
126. See id. at 798 (“The legislative history of the IIRIRA accompanying the adoption of the
definition of a ‘conviction’ gave no indication of an intent to disturb this principle that an alien must
waive or exhaust his direct appeal rights to have a final conviction.” (citing In re Punu 22 I. & N. Dec.
224 (B.I.A. 1998))).
127. Id.
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the Board avoided further discussion of the finality requirement by
determining that Abreu’s late-reinstated appeal with the State was not a
direct appeal, and thus fell within the second prong of 101(a)(48)(A) of the
Act.128 Thus, in qualifying Abreu’s late-reinstated appeal as a deferred
adjudication, the court found that his conviction was final for immigration
purposes.129
The Second Circuit, in Abreu v. Holder, vacated and remanded the case,
noting that the Board could not avoid the issue of finality.130 In doing so,
the court highlighted the government’s inconsistency regarding the issue of
finality.131 The Second Circuit thus recognized the possibility that an
appeal could preclude a finding of finality of a conviction for immigration
purposes in demanding that the Board address the issue as opposed to
affirming its decision.132
C. The Fifth Circuit: Finality Eliminated for Deferred Adjudications
In Moosa v. INS,133 the Fifth Circuit held that section 101(a)(48)(A)
eliminated the finality requirement for deferred adjudications.134 In April of
1989, Wazirali Moosa applied to adjust his status to permanent residency,
but later that year was indicted in Texas for a second-degree felony to which
he pled guilty.135 He was placed on an eight-year probation, and in 1992,
128. See id. at 798–99 (“Congress’s treatment of deferred adjudication proceedings in the IIRIRA
informs our approach to late-reinstated appeals because both procedures present an added measure of
delay and uncertainty regarding the consequences of criminal convictions in immigration proceedings.”
(emphasis added)).
129. See id. at 799–800 (“Congress eliminated the additional part of the Ozkok rule that
exempted criminal aliens with a deferred adjudication from the immigration consequences of a
conviction if they retained a right to pursue further proceedings to contest their guilt at an unknown
time in the future.”).
130. See Abreu v. Holder, 378 F. App’x 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In these circumstances, we think
a remand is appropriate for the B.I.A. to address, in the first instance, whether the IIRIRA’s definition
of conviction is ambiguous with respect to the finality requirement.”).
131. See id. at 61 (“[T]he government takes inconsistent positions, arguing at one point that the
statutory definition of conviction is unambiguous . . . while arguing elsewhere that the question of
finality is not before our Court . . . .”).
132. See id. at 62 (noting the propriety of addressing the issue of finality, but urging the Board
to “determine on remand whether a conviction is sufficiently final to warrant removal when a petitioner
has a direct appeal pending.”).
133. Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999).
134. See id. at 1006 (“Moosa’s deferred adjudication meets each prong of the new definition of
‘conviction.’ Accordingly, his deferred adjudication was a conviction for purposes of the immigration
laws.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012))).
135. Id. at 998.
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INS determined that he was not eligible to adjust status based on his
conviction.136 In agreeing with that determination, the court acknowledged
that IIRIRA deliberately omitted the finality requirement as it related to
deferred adjudications.137
Moosa contended that allowing the elimination of the finality requirement
would lead to inadequate results.138 The court disagreed, finding that
Moosa’s contention was not at issue—because there was no appeal
pending—and further, that even if the elimination of the finality rule were
to lead to inadequate results as applied to deferred adjudications, that
decision is better addressed by the Legislative Branch.139
The Third Circuit read Moosa narrowly and concluded the decision
eliminated the finality rule only “as to deferred adjudications, not as to direct
appeals,” consistent with the Third Circuit’s general stance. The Ninth
Circuit, however, decided to interpret Moosa more broadly, arguing that
Moosa stood for the proposition that the enactment of IIRIRA had changed
136. See id. at 1000 (“Permanent residence may not be granted [to] aliens ‘convicted’ of a felony.”
(emphasis added) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(1)(C)(ii))).
137. See id. at 1009 (“There is no indication that the finality requirement imposed by Pino, and
this court, prior to 1996, survives the new definition of ‘conviction’ found in IIRIRA § 322(a). . . .
More important[ly], the Conference Report specifically cites deferred adjudications as being covered
by the new definition.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 223–24 (1996) (Conf. Rep.))).
138. See id. (“Moosa maintains that taking away the finality requirement would lead to absurd
results, such as an alien being deported when his conviction is on appeal, but the conviction later being
reversed.”).
139. See id. (“Congress has made the policy choice to eliminate the finality requirement, and we
will not second-guess such policy choices properly made by the legislative branch.”). This
determination is a clear example of the plenary power doctrine:
The doctrine can be visualized in either of two ways: (1) the statute is upheld on the merits because
the substantive power of Congress is so great that the statute is assumed to be constitutional; or
(2) the courts have unusually limited power to review the constitutionality of immigration statutes (or
none at all). Under either theory, the practical result is that Congress has a virtual blank check to
formulate the immigration policies it thinks best. Over the past century, Congress has cashed this
check many times.
Legomsky, Fear and Loathing, supra note 4, at 1616–17 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Whether
or not Legomsky is correct in that Congress has a “virtual blank check,” the check is cashed by both
Congress and the courts, for it allows avoidance of issues without the expectation of an explanation
from either. See Marc Edward Jácome, Deportation in the United States: A Historical Analysis and
Recommendations, 12 MICH. J. PUB. AFF. 22, 30 (2015) (recommending the elimination of the plenary
power doctrine as it “has allowed Congress and the executive branch to wield unchecked powers in
excluding noncitizens from the United States”); see also Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 2 at 255
(“In an undeviating line of cases spanning almost one hundred years, the Court has declared itself
powerless to review even those immigration provisions that explicitly classify on such disfavored bases
as race, gender, and legitimacy.”).
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the definition of a conviction for immigration purposes established in Ozkok
and thus had eliminated the finality requirement both for deferred
adjudications—consistent with legislative history—and direct appeals as of
right.140
In the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the omission of footnote 7 in Ozkok from
the definition of a “conviction” codified in section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act
meant that the finality rule was eliminated from all convictions.141
However, the Ninth Circuit seemed to purposely overlook that the Fifth
Circuit in Moosa specifically stated that footnote 7 “superimposed” a finality
requirement “on the[] three requirements” of Ozkok which related to
deferred adjudications.142
D. The Sixth Circuit: Collateral Attack
In United States v. Garcia-Echaverria,143 a lawful permanent resident, was
convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment pursuant to a drug
conviction in January of 1997.144 Marco Garcia-Echaverria was removed
two years later in September of 1999 based on the drug conviction while a
collateral attack was pending in state court.145 After being removed,
Garcia-Echaverria was arrested in August of 2001 for speeding.146 GarciaEchaverria’s order of deportation was then reinstated,147 and the district

140. Compare Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 2014) (announcing the
principle from Ozkok “‘is alive and well’ in this Circuit and is correctly applied to Orabi as this Circuit’s
precedent” (quoting In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552 n.7 (1988))), and Planes v. Holder, 686 F.3d
1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 2012) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“The Fifth Circuit in Moosa . . . held only that the
finality rule had been eliminated as to deferred adjudications . . . Moosa unquestionably did not deal with
direct appeals as of right.”), with id. at 1035 (Ikuta, J., concurring) (“In Moosa, the Fifth Circuit
considered whether Congress intended to retain the ‘finality requirement’ that the B.I.A. had
‘superimposed’ on the definition of ‘conviction’ . . . and concluded that the finality requirement had
been eliminated by the new statutory language of IIRIRA.” (quoting Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1000)).
141. Planes, 686 F.3d at 1036.
142. Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1000.
143. United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2004).
144. Id. at 443.
145. See id. (“[T]he Clerk of the Court of Appeals for Kentucky wrote a letter to the U.S.
Attorney’s Office, [stating] that the appeal docketed on May 30, 2000 . . . [was] ‘a collateral attack on a
judgment of conviction . . . not a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction.’” (citation omitted)).
146. See id. at 444 (noting Garcia-Echaverria’s traffic stop, which led to an arrest after the
“[o]fficers of the Highway Patrol notified the INS”).
147. See id. (“[I]nforming Garcia-Echaverria . . . that his prior order of deportation had been
reinstated.”); see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012) (giving
the Attorney General authority to deport a previously removed noncitizen through a reinstatement of
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court found that his conviction was final regardless of the pending collateral
attack in state court.148
The Sixth Circuit conceded that a conviction requires finality.149
Nonetheless, it found that Garcia-Echaverria did not have a direct appeal
pending when he was initially deported, but rather that his post-conviction
motions were collateral attacks.150 It further concluded that his “time for
filing a direct appeal had expired in 1997.”151 Thus, relying on state court
records, the Sixth Circuit held that “Garcia-Echaverria’s conviction was
final for removal purposes.”152
The Ninth Circuit, in a footnote, recognized that “the Sixth Circuit
retained its exhaustion-or-waiver requirement,” but highlighted that it “did
so without analyzing the effect or import of [section 101(a)(48)(A) of the
Act].”153 In contrast, the Third Circuit emphasized that Garcia-Echaverria
involved a collateral attack and not a direct appeal as of right.154
E. The Seventh Circuit: Interpreted Differently by the Ninth and Third Circuits
In Montenegro v. Aschroft,155 Marcelino Montenegro was convicted of an
aggravated felony in April of 1996, for which he was sentenced to twenty

removal, and allowing the reinstatement of a removal order if “the Attorney General finds that an alien
has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed”).
148. See Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d at 445 (acknowledging the district court’s jurisdiction over
the instant case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231); see also Shoba S. Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and
the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 8 (2014) (“Individuals who receive a reinstatement order
may challenge its legality in a federal court of appeals through a legal vehicle called a ‘petition for
review.’”).
149. See Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d at 445 (“To support an order of deportation, a conviction
must be final. Finality requires the defendant to have exhausted or waived his rights to direct appeal.”
(citations omitted)).
150. See id. (“[A] motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence is a collateral attack and need
normally to be filed within three years of final judgment.”).
151. See id. at 445–46 (“At the time Garcia-Echaverria was convicted, a direct appeal from a
criminal conviction was required to have been filed within ten days of final judgment.” (citations
omitted)).
152. See id. at 446 (“The Kentucky court records as a whole indicate that the appeal pending
when Garcia-Echaverria was removed pertained to collateral attacks upon his conviction.”).
153. Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 999 n.7 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d
at 440).
154. See Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 542 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e do not retain
jurisdiction for immigration purposes in our Court when a collateral appeal is taken from a criminal
judgment adverse to a petitioner because it is not a direct appeal.” (citations omitted)).
155. Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
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years in prison and subsequently found removable.156 Montenegro was in
the process of appealing his criminal conviction when INS initiated removal
proceedings.157 An immigration judge ordered Montenegro removed and
revoked his lawful permanent resident status after delaying the proceedings
for two years.158
Montenegro attacked the finality of his conviction, arguing that he had
been denied due process.159 The Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed,
holding the finality requirement had been eliminated through IIRIRA’s
enactment.160 In doing so, the court applied IIRIRA retroactively to
Montenegro’s April 1996 conviction,161 and concluded it was final for
immigration purposes.162
The Ninth Circuit seemingly interprets Montenegro as broadly as it did
Moosa, and highlights the proposition in the case which states that
“IIRIRA . . . treats an alien ‘convicted’ once a court enters a formal judgment of

156. Id. at 36.
157. Id. Removal proceedings were initiated pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), “which
provides for the removal of an alien convicted of an ‘aggravated felony.’” Id.
158. See id. (“The [immigration judge] delayed the proceedings until October 1998 . . . .”). This
is important because IIRIRA was enacted in September of 1996 and its provisions went into effect on
April 1, 1997. IIRIRA’s provisions, as previously discussed, were most detrimental to noncitizens, like
Montenegro, whose convictions were classified as “aggravated felonies.” Johnson, supra note 48, at 483
(“Since the INA’s definitions of ‘aggravated felony’ and ‘conviction’ were expanded by the AEDPA
and the IIRIRA, more LPRs are subject to removal today than before the acts became effective in
1997.”).
159. See Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037 (“At the time the [immigration judge] ordered Montenegro
removed, he had two petitions still pending—a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court
and an appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition in the Illinois Appellate Court—both of
which were later denied.”).
160. See id. (“There is no indication that the finality requirement imposed by Pino, and this court,
prior to 1996, survives the new definition of ‘conviction’ found in IIRIRA § 322(a).” (quoting Moosa
v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1999))).
161. See id. (“The amendments made by subsection (a) [including the definition of ‘conviction’]
shall apply to convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this
Act.” (quoting Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 322(c), 110 Stat. 3009–546, 629)). Had Montenegro’s conviction been adjudicated prior to
the enactment and promulgation of IIRIRA, he would have had some avenue of relief if the statutory
requirements were met. See Johnson, supra note 48, 27 J. LEGIS. 477, 481 (“[P]rior to 1996, an LPR
could obtain relief from deportation even if convicted of an aggravated felony, as long as he or she had
served at least five years in prison to atone for the criminal activity and had other favorable extenuating
circumstances.”).
162. See Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 10370–38 (“IIRIRA, however, treats an alien as ‘convicted’ once
a court enters a formal judgment of guilt.” (emphasis added)).
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guilt.”163 In contrast, and not surprisingly, the Third Circuit interpreted
Montenegro more narrowly, also as it did Moosa, by noting that the appeals
pending did not involve a direct appeal.164 Thus, the Third Circuit did not
find the finality rule as applied to direct appeals under Montenegro was
eliminated by the enactment of IIRIRA,165 but rather interpreted Montenegro
as holding that IIRIRA eliminated the finality rule as applied to noncitizens
who have exhausted or waived all direct appeals to which they are entitled to,
even if their convictions may be open to collateral appeals or discretionary
review within the agency.166
F. The Tenth Circuit: In Agreement with the Ninth Circuit
The first time the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of finality was in
United States v. Saenz-Gomez.167 Javier Saenz-Gomez was indicted for
“possession with intent to distribute heroin and conspiracy to distribute”
the same, to which he pled not guilty.168 He was nonetheless found guilty
and sentenced “to a twelve-year term of imprisonment,” which was
suspended pursuant to a five-year probation period.169 “On May 2, 2003,
before defense counsel filed a notice of appeal,”170 Saenz-Gomez was
deported pursuant to an expedited removal order.171 Eighteen days later,

163. Planes v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012) (Ikuta, J., concurring). But see id.
at 1039 n.4 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the Montenegro decision as one that “involved a
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court and a collateral attack on a conviction, neither of which is
a direct appeal as of right and neither of which affected the finality of a conviction for immigration
purposes even under pre-IIRIRA case law.”).
164. See Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 542 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting the Montenegro
decision involved “a collateral appeal and a petition of certiorari rather than a direct appeal” (citing
Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1035) (emphasis added)); see also Planes, 686 F.3d at 1049 n.4 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting) (standing for the same proposition).
165. See Gokhale, supra note 8, at 252 (“The government’s brief filed in opposition to
Montenegro’s appeal of his removal order argued that Montenegro would be considered convicted for
immigration purposes regardless of whether the finality rule survived the enactment of IIRIRA.”
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added)).
166. See Orabi, 738 F.3d at 542 (describing Montenegro as a situation that involved a collateral
appeal); see also Gokhale, supra note 8, at 252 (“According to the Seventh Circuit’s own precedent, the
fact that survival of the finality rule was not relevant to the disposition of the case made the discussion
of the finality rule dicta, weakening its value as precedent.” (footnote omitted)).
167. United States v. Saenz-Gomez, 472 F.3d 791 (10th Cir. 2007).
168. Id. at 791–92.
169. Id. at 792.
170. Id.
171. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 48, at 477 (“[T]he IIRIRA increased the INS’s authority to
expedite removals of ‘aggravated felons’ . . . by giving the Attorney General authority under INA § 238
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defense counsel filed a timely notice of appeal, and about a year later, SaenzGomez was again removed based on illegal reentry.172 In September of
2005, Saenz-Gomez was indicted and pled guilty to “illegal reentry to the
United States after deportation following a conviction for an aggravated
felony.”173 A twelve-level sentencing enhancement was added based on
the fact that he “was previously deported ‘after a conviction for a felony
drug trafficking offense.’”174 Saenz-Gomez contested the twelve-level
enhancement as being improper, arguing that because he was not allowed
to directly appeal his state conviction prior to being deported, his state
conviction was not final.175
The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting the lack of ambiguity in the current
The court emphasized the plain language of
statute.176
section 101(a)(48)(A), which, the court explained, made it clear that a
conviction is “a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court.”177 The
Tenth Circuit, in affirming Saenz-Gomez’s conviction, noted the plain
language of the statute made it clear that it was Congress’s intent to omit
the finality requirement;178 hence, Saenz-Gomez’s conviction was final for
immigration purposes.179
The Tenth Circuit again addressed the issue of finality four years later in
Waugh v. Holder.180 In that case, a lawful permanent resident was found
removable based on a state court conviction that amounted to an aggravated
felony for immigration purposes.181 Before his removal proceedings were
to begin removal proceedings and to attempt to complete all appeals thereof before the alien has been
released from custody.” (footnotes omitted)).
172. Saenz-Gomez, 472 F.3d at 792.
173. Id.
174. See id. (“Twelve levels were added, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B), because SaenzGomez was previously deported ‘after a conviction for a felony drug trafficking offense for which the
sentence imposed was 13 months or less.’”).
175. See id. at 792–93 (“Specifically, he contends that for a conviction to serve as the basis for
deportation, that conviction must be final and a conviction is not final for immigration purposes before
direct appeal has been exhausted or waived.”).
176. See id. at 794 (“[I]t is a well[-]established law of statutory construction that, absent
ambiguity or irrational result, the literal language of the statute controls.” (citations omitted)).
177. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
178. See id. (“[T]he definition of a conviction found in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) ‘says nothing
about the finality requirement.’”).
179. Id. (“Because the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) is clear and does not lead to
an irrational result, the statutory language controls and the written judgment filed against Saenz-Gomez
is a conviction for purposes of Section 1326(b) and U.S.S.G. 2L1.2.”).
180. Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2011).
181. Id. at 1280.
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finalized, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky,182 holding that the
Sixth Amendment, as applied to a noncitizen defendant, “includes the right
to be advised of the risk of removal resulting from a guilty plea.”183 In light
of Padilla’s holding, the petitioner moved to withdraw his guilty plea and
terminate his removal proceedings.184 The immigration judge denied both
requests, noting the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment challenge to his state
court conviction was a collateral attack, and thus his conviction was
sufficiently final for immigration purposes.185 The petitioner appealed the
immigration judge’s decision to the B.I.A., who denied his request on similar
grounds.186
The Tenth Circuit, in denying the petition for review, initially emphasized
the court’s limited jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims.187 Furthermore,
the court held that section 101(a)(48)(A) was enacted “specifically to
supplant a prior B.I.A. interpretation that required deportation to wait until
direct appellate review (though never collateral review) of the conviction was
exhausted or waived.”188 Thus, for a noncitizen to be found deportable
under the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation, all that is required is “a formal
judgment of guilt [be] entered by a trial court.”189
In interpreting Saenz-Gomez, the Ninth Circuit—consistent with its own
view of the finality rule—understood the Tenth Circuit’s decision as
standing for the proposition that the enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A)
eliminated the finality requirement.190 In contrast, the Third Circuit—also
consistent with its view of what constitutes a “conviction” under IIRIRA—
182. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
183. Waugh, 642 F.3d at 1280 (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373).
184. Id.
185. See id. at 1281 (“The IJ further held that, until it was vacated or overturned by the state
court, petitioner’s conviction constituted a valid conviction to which the IJ had to give full faith and
credit.”).
186. See id. (“Like the IJ, the B.I.A. held that petitioner’s arguments were in the nature of a
collateral attack on his conviction and could not be entertained by the IJ or the B.I.A..”).
187. See id. at 1283 (“[P]etitioner ignores a fundamental limitation: neither the IJ nor the B.I.A.
has authority to adjudicate the constitutionality of an underlying criminal conviction.” (citing Trench
v. INS, 783 F.2d 181, 184 (10th Cir. 1986))).
188. Id. at 1284 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Adame-Orozco, 607 F.3d 647, 653
(10th Cir. 2010)) (referring to the parallel statute contained at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012)).
189. Id. (quoting United States v. Adame-Orozco, 607 F.3d 647, 653 (10th Cir. 2010)).
190. See Planes v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 2012) (Ikuta, J., concurring) (“[T]he
Tenth Circuit explained in no uncertain terms that Congress defined ‘conviction’ in [8 U.S.C.]
§ 1101(a)(48)(A) ‘specifically to supplant a prior B.I.A. interpretation that had required deportation to
wait until direct appellate review (though never collateral review) of the conviction was exhausted or
waived.’” (citations omitted)).
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attempted to construe Saenz-Gomez’s holding more narrowly by highlighting
that the appeal was denied “where his collateral attack was pending.”191
Thus, the Third Circuit stayed consistent with its belief that finality of a
conviction is required when the appeal involves a direct appeal as of right as
opposed to a collateral appeal. The Third Circuit did concede, however,
that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Saenz-Gomez “purports to hold that a
petitioner is not entitled to a direct appeal as of right prior to being
deported.”192
VI. CIRCUIT COURT OVERVIEW
The split between the Ninth and Third Circuits over whether the finality
rule has been eliminated as a result of the enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A)
of the Act is prominent.193 Where other circuit courts stand is less certain.
Most do agree, however, on two key points: (1) the finality rule does not
reach appeals based on collateral attacks,194 and (2) a deferred adjudication
constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes, regardless of whether all
appeals have been exhausted or waived.195
191. Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 542 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
192. Id. (citing Planes, 686 F.3d at 1039 n.4 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).
193. Compare Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Accordingly, we conclude
that the first definition of ‘conviction’ in [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(a)(48)(A) requires only that the trial court
enter a formal judgment of guilt, without any requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or
waived.”), with Orabi, 738 F.3d at 543 (“We are therefore convinced that the principle announced and
held in Ozkok—that ‘a conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration
purposes until direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived’— . . . ‘is alive
and well’ in this Circuit and is correctly applied to Orabi as this Circuit’s precedent.” (quoting In re
Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552 n.7 (1988))).
194. See Abreu v. Holder, 378 F. App’x 59, 60 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d
686, 691 (2d Cir. 1976), for the proposition that “‘an alien is not deemed to have been “convicted” of
a crime under the [INA]’ until ‘direct appellate review of the conviction (as contrasted with collateral
attack) has been exhausted or waived’”); see also Adame-Orozco, 607 F.3d at 653 (“[W]hile the alien may
have the right to pursue appellate or collateral relief for an aggravated felony conviction under various
provisions of state and federal law, the government need not wait until all these avenues are exhausted
before deporting him.”); United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting
the pending appeal “pertained to [a] collateral attack[]” and, consequently, the conviction was
considered “final for removal purposes”).
195. See Orabi, 738 F.3d at 541 (“[T]he statute explicitly eliminated the finality requirement for
deferred adjudications.” (citations omitted)); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 998 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting
legislative history surrounding the enactment of section 101(a)(48)(A) specifically included deferred
adjudications within its definition of a conviction); Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“Implicit in this holding is a conclusion that the ‘finality’ requirement no longer applied to deferred
adjudications under the new definition . . . .” (citations omitted)); In re Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 224
(B.I.A. 1998) (highlighting congressional intent to exclude the finality requirement under the third
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VII. THE EFFECT OF FINALITY OR LACK THEREOF
A. Convicted Noncitizens
As noted earlier, IIRIRA in conjunction with the AEDPA expanded the
list of crimes that qualified as aggravated felonies under the INA.196
Additionally, Congress made both statutes retroactive, broadening not only
the scope of both statutes, but also their reach.197 Thus, a lawful permanent
resident whose conviction was not considered an aggravated felony prior to
the enactment of the IIRIRA and the AEDPA was considered an aggravated
felon if his or her prior conviction fell within the newly broadened list.198
Furthermore, noncitizens who have challenged this retroactive application
of the statutes through ex post facto199 claims have consistently been
dismissed by the courts,200 because immigration law is considered civil

element in Ozkok for purposes of deferred adjudications). This reasoning mostly attributed to
Congress’s clear intent to include deferred adjudications within the definition of a conviction. See H.R.
REP. NO. 104–828, at 224 (1996) (“This new provision, by removing the third prong of Ozkok, clarifies
congressional intent that even in cases where adjudication is ‘deferred,’ the original finding or confession of
guilt is sufficient to establish a ‘conviction’ for purposes of the immigration laws.” (emphasis added)).
196. Johnson, supra note 48, at 477. The discussion in this article is meant to cover the
consequences of a conviction for all noncitizen who have been determined “convicted” within the
meaning of IIRIRA; however, it often centers on the consequences for those noncitizens labeled
“aggravated felons,” because the impact for them is the most sweeping and severe. See Bruce Robert
Marley, Comment, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the Retroactive Application of Aggravated Felony
Convictions to Lawful Permanent Residents, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 855, 859 (1998) (“Because an aggravated
felony offense is generally dependent on a ‘conviction’ and ‘term of imprisonment,’ concomitant with
the expansion of ‘aggravated felony,’ IIRIRA mutates established judicial constructions of the terms
‘conviction’ and ‘term of imprisonment,’ thereby imposing upon the greatest possible number of
immigrants the designation of aggravated felon.” (citations omitted)).
197. See Alfarache v. Cravener, 203 F.3d 381, 381 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (stating AEDPA’s
limits on discretionary relief were permissibly retroactive and did not violate equal protection or due
process, and further, AEDPA’s expanded definition of “aggravated felony” applied to pre-AEDPA
convictions); see also Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and The Lost Cause of
Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 673 (2008) (noting expansion was purposeful in retroactivity).
198. See Marley, supra note 196, at 862 (“[L]awful permanent residents with a petty prior offense
that has been retroactively recharacterized as an aggravated felony are treated in exactly the same
manner as illegal aliens who enter the United States in 1998 specifically to commit a terrorist act.”).
199. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”).
200. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594–95 (1952) (finding inapplicable the ex
post facto clause in deportation proceedings); see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“And
whatever might have been said at an earlier date for applying the ex post facto [c]lause, it has been the
unbroken rule of this Court that it has no application to deportation.” (emphasis added)).
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rather than criminal and as such deportation is not viewed as
punishment,201 but instead as a collateral consequence.202
B. Due Process Considerations
In considering whether the Executive and Legislative branches should
continue to view deportation as a consequence of a proceeding rather than
as retribution, Justice Brewer’s dissent in Fong Yue Ting v. United States203 is
noteworthy:
[D]eportation is punishment. Everyone knows that to be forcibly taken away
from home and family and friends and business and property, and sent across
the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe
and cruel . . . .
But punishment implies a trial: ‘No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.’ Due process requires that a man be
heard before he is condemned, and both heard and condemned in the due
and orderly procedure of a trial, as recognized by the common law from time
immemorial.204

As Justice Brewer so clearly notes, it is undeniable that lawful permanent
residents are owed procedural due process205 at a minimum during

201. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“[Deportation] is not a
banishment . . . [i]t is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not
complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the government . . . has determined that
his continuing to reside here shall depend.”). But see Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 600 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(calling deportation punishment through banishment and a deprivation of “all that makes life worth
while”).
202. See Marley, supra note 196, at 890 (“[D]eportation, nonetheless, is considered simply a
collateral administrative matter, or, at best, a civil proceeding.” (footnote omitted)).
203. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
204. Id. at 740–41.
205. Due process is defined as a full and fair hearing that includes:
[T]he right to be informed of rights and charges, the right to counsel at no cost to the government,
the right to a translator for aliens with little or no understanding of English, and the right to
examine the evidence against an alien and opportunity to rebut, including the right to crossexamine an adverse witness.
Bradley J. Wyatt, Note, Even Aliens are Entitled to Due Process: Extending Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing to
Board of Immigration Appeals Procedural Reforms, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 605, 614–15 (2004)
(footnotes omitted).
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deportation proceedings.206 The view that deportation is not punishment,
however, greatly diminishes both the substantive and procedural rights of
noncitizens.207 Additionally, in determining whether a noncitizen has been
provided with due process, the Supreme Court has limited the judiciary “to
determining whether the procedures [used] meet the essential standard of
fairness under the Due Process Clause.”208 Therefore, although noncitizens
are granted limited209 procedural safeguards through the exercise of the

206. See Legomsky, Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 259 (“The one partial exception to the
absolute character of Congress’s power over immigration concerns procedural due process. Despite a
leading early decision to the contrary, it is now accepted that aliens undergoing deportation proceedings
are entitled to procedural due process.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
207. See id. at 260 (“[I]mmigration is an area in which the normal rules of constitutional law
simply do not apply.”). Foundational aspects of due process may be lacking. For example:
[P]oor immigrants have no right to appointed counsel (despite the notorious complexity of
immigration law); immigrants have no protection against retroactive changes in the law (they can
plead guilty to minor offenses based upon the correct advice of counsel that they will not be
deported and the next day Congress can change the rules); immigrants have no right to have their
proceedings in any particular venue (instead the government can whisk immigrants away into
detention thousands of miles away from their home where they lack access to the counsel,
evidence, and witnesses they need to prevail in their removal proceeding); and immigrants can be
deported for the most minor offenses, such as turnstile jumping or shoplifting candy (without
any constitutional limit on the disproportionate punishment).
Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1302 (2011) (footnotes
omitted); see also Wyatt, supra note 205, at 610 (“Courts have long held that aliens are entitled to due
process protection in immigration proceedings. The extent of that due process protection, however,
has been extremely narrow.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
208. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34–35 (1982) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court’s
decision applied a due process balancing test to deportation proceedings and, thus,
In evaluating the procedures in any case, the courts must consider the interest at stake for the
individual, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well
as the probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the
government in using the current procedures rather than additional or different procedures.
Wyatt, supra note 205, at 616 (quoting Landon, 459 U.S. at 34).
209. See Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture: Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801,
853 (2013) (“[D]espite recognizing that aliens are entitled to due process in removal proceedings, the
Supreme Court has consistently regarded the Executive’s power as virtually unlimited with respect to
the substantive bases upon which removal may be effectuated.” (citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 11 (1990))). But see David Cole,
In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1007 (2002) (“[D]ue
process places significant constraints on the government’s power to detain individuals pursuant to
immigration authority.”).
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Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, they are nonetheless owed a full
and fair hearing in which to contest removability.210
C. Relief from Removal
As noted earlier, the enactment of IIRIRA, not only greatly expanded the
list of crimes that qualified as aggravated felonies, but also substantially
reduced relief from removal for noncitizens categorized as aggravated
felons211 and insulated discretionary claims for relief from judicial
review.212 Among the relief IIRIRA eliminated or curtailed for noncitizens
convicted of aggravated felonies are “212(c) relief,”213 the “212(h)
210. See Wyatt, supra note 205, at 622 (“Certainly, the B.I.A. is endowed with great power to
administer the immigration laws of this country, and with that power comes the responsibility to
administer them fairly—fundamental fairness is the touchstone of due process.” (citing Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973))).
211. As stated previously, the focus of this comment is not solely on noncitizens who have been
labeled aggravated felons. However, it is important to highlight the consequences of IIRIRA’s
expansive scope in characterizing noncitizens as “aggravated felons” for petty offenses, as they result
in lack of procedural due process in judicial proceedings, and limitations on relief from removal,
regardless of a noncitizen’s stake in this country. See Marley, supra note 196, at 881 (“Legislation that
treats petty offenders who are long-term residents of the United States in essentially the same manner
as it treats illegal aliens who commit serious crimes is inherently unfair and inequitable.”); see also Won
Kidane, The Challenges of Representing Detained Noncitizens in Expedited Removal Proceedings from the Perspective
of the Dickinson School of Law Immigration Clinic, 17 WIDENER L.J. 391, 394 (2008) (“For purposes of
immigration law . . . pulling someone else’s hair during a night club fistfight might qualify as an
aggravated felony barring almost all forms of relief.”). Certainly, “immigrants who commit serious
crimes should be deported, regardless of the consequences.” Marley, supra note 196, at 881.
212. See Grant, supra note 49, at 928 (highlighting enactment of IIRIRA which “eliminated
certain forms of relief, created new forms with more circumscribed eligibility criteria, and restricted
appellate review”); see also Marley, supra note 196, at 860 (“The 1996 legislation essentially denied any
form of relief from deportation for all aggravated felons, and just as significant, severely restricted or
eliminated judicial review over most denials of discretionary relief or final orders of deportation.”).
213. Section 212(c) of the Act “granted the Attorney General discretion to waive the
inadmissibility of certain qualifying lawful permanent residents.” Patrick Glen, Judulang v. Holder and
the Future of 212(c) Relief, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1 (2012) (citing Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (amended 1996)); see also Yolanda Vazquez, Advising Noncitizen
Defendants on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense
Lawyer, the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 31, 45 (2007) (“Prior to 1996,
more than half of the applications under § 212(c) received relief from deportation.” (citing Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 n.5 (2001))). However, this provision was repealed
with the enactment of IIRIRA. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009–597 (1996). Note, however, that the Supreme Court
later decided, in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), that “212(c) relief
remains available . . . notwithstanding its repeal, in circumstances where the alien pled guilty to an
offense prior to the repeal, and would have been eligible for 212(c) relief at the time of his or her plea.”
Glen, supra, at 1 (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326).
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waiver,”214 voluntary departure,215 asylum,216 and withholding of
removal.217 The consequences of a conviction post-IIRIRA are therefore
drastic in measure.218 Eliminating the requirement of finality from the
definition of a “conviction” for immigration purposes further precludes a
noncitizen from adequately litigating their claim. Without the appropriate
relief available and with no ability to stay in the country to properly appeal
a potentially erroneous claim, a noncitizen is essentially deprived of his or
her procedural due process rights.219
D. Finality and Due Process
The Supreme Court has long held that a rule that precludes a person from
pursuing an appeal may itself be a violation of due process.220 Moreover,
it has also long been held that noncitizens are entitled to the protection of
214. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, § 348, 110 Stat. 3009–639.
212(h) relief similarly provided the Attorney General with discretion “to waive certain criminal grounds
to exclusion, specifically marijuana possession; importantly, it did not specifically include aggravated
felonies as a bar to the waiver.” Marley, supra note 196, at 876 (footnote omitted) (citing Immigration
and Nationality Act § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1994) (amended 1996)). By eliminating the 212(h)
waiver, not only did Congress further limit relief for noncitizens, it also insulated judicial review “by
providing that ‘no court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant
or deny a waiver.’” Id. at 877 (quoting Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,
§ 348, 110 Stat. 3009–639).
215. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, § 604, 110 Stat. 3009–596.
Voluntary departure is a procedure that allows a noncitizen to leave the United States without the
consequences of a final order of deportation. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET. AL., IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 750 (8th ed. 2016) (noting the “negative consequences of a
formal removal order include inadmissibility for ten years,” and may include “a felony prosecution” if
a noncitizen reenters the United States unlawfully”).
216. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, § 604, 110 Stat. 3009–690–
91; see Marley, supra note 196, at 878 (noting IIRIRA requires asylum applications “be filed within one
year,” thus, this form of relief is likely not applicable to lawful permanent residents).
217. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, § 305, 110 Stat. 3009–597–
607; Marley, supra note 196, at 878–79 (noting “[w]ithholding was disallowed to an alien who” had “a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime”; thus, this disqualified noncitizens convicted of an
aggravated felony as they “were considered to have committed a ‘particularly serious crime’” (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1996))).
218. Johnson, supra note 48, at 488–89 (arguing in favor of greater relief to ameliorate some of
AEDPA and IIRIRA’s “harsh consequences”).
219. See Gokhale, supra note 8, at 268 (emphasizing the necessity of “an opportunity to appeal
a criminal conviction at trial,” in order to comply with the due process owed to noncitizens).
220. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (“The Court traditionally
has held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as
defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances.” (emphasis
added)).
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments while in this country, and specifically
in immigration proceedings, where their ability to stay in this country is at
risk.221 As noted above, the consequences of a “conviction” are grave222
even for those noncitizens whom the courts have agreed are owed additional
procedural safeguards due to their stake in this country.223 However, even
though there is considerable agreement that some noncitizens have rights
under the Constitution and, further, that all noncitizens are guaranteed some
constitutional and procedural protections regardless of their status,224
courts have consistently excused lack of substantive and procedural due
process by shielding themselves behind Congress’s plenary power
doctrine.225
If a noncitizen is not given a full and fair opportunity to contest their
underlying conviction, they immediately become subject to deportation,226
with little to no avenues for relief.227 Moreover, the act of deportation
greatly decreases not only their opportunity and right to be heard in

221. See Wyatt, supra note 205, at 610 (“Courts have long held that aliens are entitled to due
process protection in immigration proceedings.”); see also Cole, supra note 209, at 370 (“The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection guarantees extend to all ‘persons.’”).
222. See Vazquez, supra note 213, at 41 (discussing the authority exercised by federal criminal
court judges “to order deportation of a noncitizen defendant during a criminal court proceeding,
thereby bypassing immigration court and expediting the removal of the noncitizen defendant from the
United States” (citing Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrects Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–
416, § 224, 108 Stat. 4305, 4322–24 (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)))).
223. See Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1565, 1674–75 (2013) (“[T]he law distinguishes LPRs from other noncitizens, often granting privileges
to the former that it denies the latter.”).
224. Cole, supra note 209, at 381 (“[T]he Constitution extends fundamental protections of due
process, political freedoms, and equal protection to all persons subject to our laws, without regard to
citizenship.”).
225. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”).
In fact, Congressional power over immigration laws are what have created restrictive and deportationdriven legislation such as IIRIRA and AEDEPA that often overstep and violate a noncitizen’s due
process rights. See Wyatt, supra note 205, at 621 (discussing IIRIRA’s effect on a person’s due process
rights); see also Robert Pauw, Plenary Power: An Outmoded Doctrine That Should Not Limit IIRIRA Reform,
51 EMORY L.J. 1095, 1096 (2002) (“[I]n many respects the injustices caused by IIRIRA are not
constrained by constitutional considerations.”).
226. See Kidane, supra note 211, at 393 (“When immigrants are accused of criminal conduct, the
penalty that awaits them is not limited to incarceration for a certain period of time or a fine under the
applicable criminal laws; it often includes deportation.”).
227. Id. at 394 (“An aggravated felony . . . excludes a noncitizen from almost all forms of relief
including adjustment of status, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and even asylum from
persecution.” (footnotes omitted)).
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court,228 but also completely deprives, many times people who have been
living in this country for long periods of time, of their ability to continue
their lives in the United States.229
Reading in a finality requirement into section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act as
was done pre-IIRIRA would guarantee noncitizens the right to have a full
and fair hearing before they are deprived of their liberty, their property, and,
ultimately, the life they have built after many years in this country.230
VIII. CONCLUSION
Most circuits are in agreement that as for collateral appeals to a conviction
and situations in which adjudication of guilt has been deferred, noncitizens
do not need to exhaust all appeals to be subject to deportation. However,
the Third and Ninth Circuits disagree as to whether noncitizens are entitled
to the exhaustion of all appeals when they are direct appeals as of right.231
The Ninth Circuit, in not reading in a finality requirement to the definition
of a conviction under IIRIRA, denies a noncitizen the full extent of their

228. Gokhale, supra note 8, at 267 (“[R]emoval renders an appeal completely ineffective in
jurisdictions that will dismiss an appeal as moot when a defendant is deported.”); see also Javier
Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact
on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115, 115 (1999) (“[A]liens subject to deportation
are deprived of many of the constitutional protections available to those prosecuted under our criminal
laws.”).
229. Richard Gonzales, Immigrant Felons and Deportation: One Grandmother’s Case, NPR (Apr. 9,
2016, 9:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/09/473503408/immigrant-felons-and-deportationone-grandmothers-case-for-pardon [https://perma.cc/D3PH-EXUY] (detailing the story of Maria
Sanchez, “a 63-year-old widow, grandmother of three and a legal permanent resident” who had been
living in the United States for over forty years, but became subject to deportation due to a 1998
aggravated felony charge for growing and planting “four small plants . . . [of] cannabis in rubbing
alcohol as a tincture for her arthritis”); see also Wyatt, supra note 205, at 618 (“Though deportation is
not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of
the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.” (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,
154 (1945))).
230. Gokhale, supra note 8, at 270–71 (2005) (advocating for the “finality rule” as a way to avoid
constitutional problems and guarantee protections for noncitizens).
231. Compare Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Accordingly, we conclude
that the first definition of ‘conviction’ in [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(a)(48)(A) requires only that the trial court
enter a formal judgment of guilt, without any requirement that all direct appeals be exhausted or
waived.”), with Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We are therefore
convinced that the principle announced and held in Ozkok—that ‘a conviction does not attain a
sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review of the conviction has
been exhausted or waived’— . . . ‘is alive and well’ in this Circuit and is correctly applied to Orabi as
this Circuit’s precedent.” (quoting In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552 n.7 (1988))).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

35

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 2, Art. 6

554

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:519

procedural due process rights granted by the Constitution, regardless of
their status, because of their stake in this country.
When a noncitizen becomes subject to deportation, often after living
many years in the United States, they stand to have much to lose—family,
friends, businesses, and property. Although our country has a duty to
protect our people from threats and to enforce laws implemented to
safeguard our freedom, it also has a duty to protect those that are subject to
its laws and within its jurisdiction. The right to defend our freedom cannot
come at a cost to someone else’s freedom, not without a full and fair hearing.
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the term “aggravated felon,”
although it carries a negative connotation, does not describe murderers
exclusively nor predominantly.232 It is a term used for noncitizens who
commit crimes that range from a petty offense to more serious crimes,
including a 63-year-old grandmother looking for relief from arthritis
pain.233 At a minimum, Maria Sanchez, after forty years in this country, has
earned the right to fight for her freedom, for her family, for her livelihood.
In finding that the finality rule survives the enactment of IIRIRA and is
a part of the definition of a conviction within the meaning of
section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, Congress and the courts would effectively
establish procedural safeguards for noncitizens facing deportation, and who
are attempting to exercise their constitutional rights while facing the
threat of deportation.

232. Marley, supra note 196, at 862 (“[L]awful permanent residents with a petty prior offense
that has been retroactively recharacterized as an aggravated felony are treated in exactly the same
manner as illegal aliens who enter the United States in 1998 specifically to commit a terrorist act.”).
233. See Gonzales, supra note 229 (detailing the story of Maria Sanchez).
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